The government is seeking input on whether all sectors in
the New Zealand Emissions Trading System (NZ ETS) should move to full surrender obligations (i.e. all sectors must surrender one unit for each tonne of emissions) and how to manage the
costs of moving to full surrender obligations. To address these questions, we
need to consider what current NZ ETS price would be consistent with an efficient
long term transition (at least in expectation) to a low-emission economy, and what is likely to happen to the NZ ETS price if full surrender is implemented.
What ‘should’ the ETS price be?
The fundamental purpose of an ETS is to
constrain emissions and hence set an emissions price path that facilitates a
gradual, cost-effective transition to a low emissions economy. This is a
long-term objective and the investments and behavioural changes that will drive
the transition are long term, so the system has to be thought of over a long
period – not just in terms of current issues.
For
a cost-effective transition, emission units should be fully bankable with no
risk of confiscation. Banking
brings forward emission reductions, improves liquidity, reduces price
volatility, and creates a long-term constituency for a strong ETS. If units are
bankable (and there is a positive bank, as there is in New Zealand), then price
is determined by long-term supply, not short-term. If the NZ ETS is later linked
to a larger ETS (or other source of international units), then that larger
system will set (or at least affect) the NZ ETS price once the link begins. Linking will also heavily affect
the New Zealand price as soon as a link is anticipated. An earlier blog explored some of
these effects.
Prices are driven by expectations about long-term supply and
demand. Long-term supply in the ETS is set by governments both through and in
response to New Zealand’s international targets. Long-term supply also depends on:
- decisions around the desired rate of domestic decarbonisation and the short run balance between domestic action and funding credible mitigation action abroad,
- whether ETS participants or the government purchase international units, and
- decisions on reduction targets for sectors covered by the ETS relative to uncovered sectors (currently dominated by agriculture).
Supply is currently highly uncertain even over the next few
years (e.g. to 2020) because the government has neither outlined aims for emission
prices or domestic emissions (reduction) nor given signals about how many units
might be auctioned. Options to link our ETS internationally are highly
uncertain.
Long-term demand is also uncertain because it depends on
economic activity and mitigation costs, but these are no different than
forecasts that affect any other product. In the short term, demand is also critically
dependent on the government’s decision on whether and how quickly the non-forestry
sectors move to a full surrender obligation.
To decide on an appropriate current NZ ETS price we need to
think about what price is required to meet NZ goals for both reaching net zero
emissions in the long term, but also the total amount of emissions between now
and then – the path of reduction. Answering this analytically would require us
to predict economic activity, technology change and uptake, responsiveness to
emissions prices, and effects of non-price policies. The price required also
depends on how we might contribute to mitigation in other countries – and how
NZ takes credit for that, allowing temporarily higher domestic emissions. Estimating
an appropriate emission price is thus complex and ultimately is a question of judgement
not modelling.
One way to think about this price is the ‘social
cost of carbon’ which estimates the climate damages from emissions. In
a 2013 study a central estimate was US$37 per metric tonne of CO2 (US$11 – 109 in 2015) rising to US$26 - 220 in 2050.
These estimates and even the fundamental approach to generating them are
contentious. Key uncertainties are the rate at which countries implement
policies to reduce emissions and the rate of clean technology change and uptake
as well as the impacts of climate change and the ability of humans and natural
systems ability to adapt to them. An alternative way to think about price is to
consider prices in other jurisdictions such as California, Quebec and the
European Union.
New Zealand needs to make its own local judgement and then
make investment and policy decisions expecting that ‘best’ price is above a
minimum level, but also take into account the possibility that it may be much
higher in future.
What is likely to happen to the NZ ETS price if full surrender is implemented?
Simplistically, if full surrender is implemented the
effective price paid by non-forestry sectors will double because they need to
buy two units where they previously bought one (for activities that are eligible to receive it,
free allocation for each unit of output also doubles). In addition, because
demand has doubled from these sectors the price can be expected to rise, assuming supply remains the same. Working
against this, more mitigation should occur in response to the higher price.
However, the actual effects on price are impossible to estimate
in the absence of clear information on medium-term supply. To the extent that a
decision to move to full surrender obligations signals a higher level of NZ ETS ambition by government, the impact on price may be higher than would occur only
through the changes in demand. It will depend heavily on the effect of the
decision on market expectations. Recent NZU price rises seem likely to reflect
gradually shifting perceptions of the government’s ambition and hence limits on
future supply.
In my next blog post I will look into two more central
questions:
- Are there reasons to protect some sectors against the full price?
- Is a gradual transition to a full obligation warranted?
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